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The Strength of Ten: Three-Quarters of a
Century of Purity in Election Finance
By Jo Desha Lucas*
T IS a favorite statement of campaign orators, especially on the
eve of elections, that the franchise is part of the priceless
heritage of democratic peoples. As if in an effort to lend validity to
this aphorism democracies since the time of ancient Greece have
wrestled with the problem of maintaining honest elections.1 It has
not been an easy task. The outcome of elections is often a matter of
tremendous importance to the candidates and their backers and,
unregenerate as it may sound, there are those who have a price.
The task is made more difficult by the fact that election offenses
frequently involve persons of great political power who are ever
difficult to bring to their knees. This difficulty is compounded by
the facility with which honest members of the same political stamp
manage to convince themselves that accusations are slanders pub-
lished by the opposition for partisan advantage.
Historical Note
The history of corrupt practices acts and campaign expenditure
publicity legislation is one which has often been told and therefore
will be touched upon but lightly here.2 Bribery was a crime at
common law, and prior to the American Revolution it had been
firmly established that in casting his vote each citizen discharges
a public function the corruption of which through the payment of
money constitutes bribery.3 The constitutions of a number of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Research Ass't, University
of Virginia, Bureau of Public Administration, 1948-51. B.A., Syracuse Univ., 1947,
M.P.A., 1951; LL.B., Univ. of Virginia, 1951; LL.M., Columbia Univ., 1952.
1. OvRmAcKE, MONEY IN ELECTIONS 5-19 (1932) (hereinafter cited as OVERACKER).
The author relates instances in which a majority of Athenian citizens seem to have
been bribed. The Romans, too, permitted candidates to cut some fancy didoes. In-
stances are related in which candidates invested huge sums in facilities for enter-
taining the electorate and launched spectacles which make the most flamboyant
clambakes in American political history pale into insignificance.
2. The years between 1926 and 1932 brought a rash of books on the subject. In
addition to OVERACKER, there were: BELMONT, REtUn TO SECRET PARTY FUNDS
(1927); POLLOCK, PARTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS (1926) (hereinafter cited as PoLLocx);
RoccA, CoRRUPT PRACTICES LEGISLATION (1928); SIKES, STATE AND FEDERAL CoR-
Rupr PRACTICES LEGISLATION (1928) (hereinafter cited as SIXES). Campaign funds
has also been a popular topic for articles. The Readers' Guide to Periodical Litera-
ture lists 275 articles on this subject since the campaign fund publicity law drive
was launched in 1904. It is interesting to note that the number of such articles
tends to reach its peak during years of Republican incumbency. During the twelve
year period covered by the Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover presidential terms, the
rate was approximately six a year. During the twenty Democratic years which
followed, the rate was one and one-half. Production has reached a new high since
the Republicans returned to the White House in 1952. The rate since that time has
been over seventeen per year, and the year 1956 alone saw forty such publications.
3. Rex v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1335, 96 Eng. Rep. 214 (KB. 1762). See Perkins, SAMP-
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American states deal directly with bribery at elections, typically
providing that offenders shall be disqualified from holding office;4
and every state in the union has enacted general legislation pro-
hibiting election bribery in its crudest forms.5 Nor were our for-
bears insensitive enough to be misled by informalities of payment.
Treating, as well as the bald purchase of votes, was very early the
subject of restrictive legislation. 6
The technique of listing all legitimate expenditures and declaring
all others to be illegal was an innovation of the early nineteenth
century. In 1829, the New York legislature adopted an act which
made it a misdemeanor to make a political contribution for any
election purpose other than defraying the expenses of printing and
circulating ballots, handbills, and other papers previous to an
election.7 The obvious advantage of the act was that it was more
difficult for politicians to evade than were laws containing positive
proscriptions. Despite this advantage, the act was out of tune with
the felt necessities of election finance, and it was virtually nullified
by the New York courts in 1858.8 The device, however, has become
standard.9
Other sporadic efforts were made during the next decades to
strike at election abuses as they became manifest. The assessment
of public officers was prohibited by New York and Pennsylvania in
LING THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING, 17 U. OF Pirr. L. REv. 362, 370 (1956).
See also .Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 W. & S. 338, 341 (Pa. 1842).
4. See SIKRES 10-13. Seventeen state constitutions provide that persons found
guilty of bribery at elections shall be disqualified from holding office; twelve pro-
vide that persons convicted of bribery at elections shall be disqualified from holding
office, voting, and serving on juries; and nineteen provide that such persons shall
be disqualified from voting.
5. Id. at 258-63.
6. The Virginia House of Burgesses in 1699 enacted the following provision:
And be it further enacted by the authority foresaid, and it is hereby enacted,
That no person or persons hereafter to be elected as a burgess shall directly
or indirectly by any ways or means at his or their proper charge before his
or their election give, present or allow, to any person or persons having voice
or vote in such election any money, meat, drink or provision, or make any
present, gift, reward or entertainment or any promise, engagement or obliga-
tion to give or allow any money, meat, drink or provision, present, reward
or entertainment in order to procure the vote or votes of such person or
persons for his or their election to be a burgess or burgesses, and every per-
son or persons soe giving, presenting or allowing, making, promising or engag-
ing any money, meat, drink or provision in order to procure such election being
elected shall be disabled and incapable to sit and act as burgess in that as-
sembly, but that such election shall be void to all intents and purposes as if the
said returns or elections had never been made. 3 LAws OF VIRGINIA 173
(Hening 1699).
7. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1829, c. 373. See SIKES 120-213.
8. Htirley v. Van Wagner, 28 Barb. 109 (N.Y. 1858). The Hurley case nullified,
without expressly overruling, Jackson v. Walker, 5 Hill 27 (N.Y. 1843), which
had held that chapter 373 of the statutes of 1829 meant what it said and in effect
made illegal any election contribution not sanctioned in that chapter.
9. In 1950, twenty-nine states used this device. See Bottomley, Corrupt Practices,
30 B.U.L. REv. 331, 350-51 (1950).
[Vol. 51
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1883,10 and by Massachusetts in the following year.1 1 It was the
New York act of 1890, however, that served as the model for the
legislation of all but four American states.'2 That act for the first
time provided that candidates must file statements of their receipts
and expenditures.' 3 The act was applicable only to candidates and,
as a consequence, instead of making campaign expenditures a mat-
ter of public notice and public record, it merely insured the appoint-
ment of political committees. The chief importance of the act is
the fact that its passage began a series of efforts which by 1905
had resulted in the adoption of publicity requirements in fourteen
states.
14
While this slow progress was being made in the United States,
Great Britain, unhampered by federalism, moved much more rap-
idly. Parliament enacted the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preven-
tion Act in 1883.'5 This statute, relating to parliamentary elections,
was certainly the most detailed and comprehensive legislative
effort to regulate election corruption which had ever been made.' 6
In organization, the act followed a simple plan. Election offenses
were classified into three groups: (1) corrupt practices,'1 (2) ille-
gal practices,' 8 and (3) illegal payments.' 9 The first classification,
corrupt practices, included bribery, treating and undue influence,
personation, and aiding and abetting. The second classification, il-
legal practices, included paying or contracting for payment for
conveyance of electors to and from the polls, for use of premises
for posting of bills, etc., or for the hire of more committee rooms
than the number permitted by the schedule in the statute, and
spending or incurring expenses in excess of the maximum set out
in the statute. Voting by prohibited persons and the publishing of
false statements of withdrawal were also made illegal practices.
The third category, illegal payment, employment, or hiring, in-
cluded the following actions: knowingly providing money for a
10. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1883, c. 354, § 11; Pa. Sess. Laws 1883, No. 89, § 1.
11. Mass. Acts 1884, c. 320, §§ 6, 7.
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1890, c. 94.
13. It was apparently patterned after the English Corrupt and Illegal Practices
Prevention Act of 1883, 46 & 47 Vicr., c. 51. This origin of the idea is denied by
Perry Belmont, who states that the New York law was an American invention.
BELMONT, RETURN TO SECRET PARTY FUNDS 26 (1927).
14. In addition, five states (Kansas, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, and Utah)
had enacted similar legislation and repealed it. Since that time all five have re-
enacted their statutes in one form or another.
15. See note 13 supra.
16. Its length and detail were a subject of some criticism in this country, and
doubts were expressed that in its entirety it could be adapted to American political
conditions.,See Belmont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, S. Doc. No. 89, 59th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1906). See also, Simms 123-25.
17. 46 & 47 Vicr., c. 51, §§ 1-6.
18. Id. §§ 7-11.
19. Id. §§ 13-21.
1957]
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payment contrary to the provisions of the act, or for expenses in-
curred in excess of any maximum amount provided in the act, and
employment of cabs, etc., for the transportation of voters to the
polls. 20
There are detailed sections dealing with penalties. Personation
and aiding or abetting personation are made felonies ;21 other cor-
rupt practices are made misdemeanors.2 2 Penalties for conviction
of illegal practices and illegal payments include fines and civil dis-
qualifications 23
The act limits expenditures ;24 and also provides for the centrali-
zation of responsibility for election finance management through
the appointment of election agents by the candidate and the chan-
neling of expenditures through such agents.2 5
It is generally conceded that the British experiment worked.
Addressing the Academy of Arts, Science, and Letters in Wisconsin
in 1894, Charles Noble Gregory quotes the editor of Century Maga-
zine as stating that the English act of 1883 was "so completely
successful from the moment of its application to an election that
it abolished corruption and bribery at one blow." Dean Gregory
continued to say that in the first election to which the act was
applied expenses declined by over seventy-five per cent and corrupt
practice charges from ninety-five to two.26 The British comment,
while somewhat more restrained, conceded the effectiveness of the
act, both in terms of reducing corrupt practices and in reducing
expenditures.2 7
20. The interdictions in this category apply both to letting, lending, and employ-
ing, on the one side, and hiring, borrowing, or using, on the other; corrupt with-
drawals from candidacy; payments for bands, torches, flags, banners, cockades,
ribbons or other marks of distinction; hiring election workers except for the
purposes set out in the act; failure to print upon bills and other literature the
name and address of the printer and publisher; and the use of committee rooms
on premises where alcoholic beverages are sold, or where any refreshment, either
food or drink, is sold for consumption on the premises, or in elementary schools.
Ibid.
21. Id. § 6(2).
22. Id. § 6(1).
23. Id. §§ 4, 5, 6(3), 10, 11, 21.
24. Expenditure ceilings were set out in the first schedule of the act, and exceed-
ing these ceilings was made an illegal practice by § 13.
25. Id. §§ 24-32.
26. GREGORY, POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAWS
FOR ITS PREVENTION 272-73 (1895). In explaining the act's success, Gregory said:
It is addressed to men's interest, to their fear and to their consciences. It
compels integrity in elections by loss of political rights, by severe criminal
penalties, and by further exposure of the offender's name to public obloquy,
and it searches his conscience and that of his agent by the most exact state-
ments made under oath and accompanied by vouchers. It deserves to be
effective and it has been so. Ibid.
27. For example:
It has been asserted that this statute, by the multiplicity of the offences
which it has created, the acts which it has prohibited, and the complexity of
its requirements, has provided such a series of pitfalls that the most wary
candidate and cautious election agent can scarcely avoid some inadvertent in-
678, [Vol. 51
HeinOnline  -- 51 Nw. U. L. Rev.  678 1956-1957
ELECTION FINANCE
The Polemic Pattern Sets
After the presidential election of 1904, a widely spread and
highly organized campaign was begun to support the adoption of
campaign fund publicity legislation at both federal and state levels.
This campaign owed much of its force to the efforts of Mr. Perry
Belmont of New York. Toward the close of the 1904 campaign
Alton B. Parker, the Democratic candidate, made the charge that
the Republicans had been the beneficiaries of large corporate con-
tributions which were in essence payments for governmental
favors.28 Although the charge was denied, it gave a great deal of
impetus to the publicity law campaign. Nevertheless, had it not
been for Mr. Belmont's belief in publicity as a solution, the public
indignation resulting from the Parker charges might have spent
itself in a drive for prohibition of corporate contributions. 29
Although the English Act of 1883 and some American legisla-
tion prior to 1904 had contained provisions dealing with publicizing
campaign contributions, as well as limiting their size and prevent-
ing specific abuses, the publicity law advocates insisted that theirs
was a fresh approach. Either as a matter of doctrine, or as a matter
of tactics, publicity laws were presented to the public as something
distinct from corrupt practices legislation. The New York law of
1890,30 it was insisted, was no offspring of the English act of 1883,
but a true innovation in the art of government. 1 The English act
was said to rest on the use of penal sanctions to prevent excessive
spending in pursuit of public office, while the New York act was
bottomed on the proposition that the corrective for corrupt solici-
tations and donations lies in the fear of negative reaction by an
informed voting public. 32
From the beginning there was a reaction against the English
legislation. 3 At first this hostility resulted from the feeling that
fringement of its enactments. Though there may be some truth in such
criticism the legislation has undoubtedly proved extremely beneficial in re-
ducing the former deplorable prevalence of corruption and excessive ex-
penditure at Parliamentary elections. 70 J.C.P. 2 (1906).
28. OvRAcKR 234-35.
29. Ibid.
30. See note 12 supra.
31. See note 13 supra.
32. BEimoNT, RrTnux To SEcRET PARTY FUNDS 129 (1927), quoting from Bel-
mont, Publicity of Election Expenditures, S. Doc. No. 89, 59th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1906):
In 1892, Michigan enacted a much more elaborate statute, making provision
not only that campaign committees should report their receipts and expendi-
tures, and regulating the details of the accounts of such committees, but that
all expenditures on behalf of candidates, with few exceptions, must be made
through the party committees. Proper provisions were also made for the
enforcement of the act.
33. "This law went further in the direction of the English Corrupt Practices
Act of 1883 than any of the other statutes above mentioned. Owing to conditions
incident to our political system, and particularly in view of the number of candi-
1957]
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since publicity laws are unique, it would confuse the issue to com-
bine them with a larger complex of corrupt practices laws.34 Later
opposition shifted to the position that penal statutes which attempt
to regulate in detail and limit the expenditures of candidates
actually subvert the publicity laws without achieving any sem-
blance of control over election finance 3 5
Recurrent Voices
Along these precise lines the controversy has raged until this
day. On one side are those who have placed their faith in publicity
and voter reaction to correct abuses in election finance. On the
other, there are those who believe in restrictive legislation to curb
spending-apparently they have a greater faith in the ingenuity
of lawmakers. As is usual with these bipolar arguments, there is
a middle position: that major emphasis should be put on publicity
as a corrective, but that at least certain of the restrictions as to
the source and amount of contributions and expenditures should
be retained.
It has been pointed out that the period between 1926 and 1932
saw the production of a large number of works on corrupt practices
and publicity law legislation.36 It is interesting to identify in these
comments the policy positions set out in the preceding paragraph,
to compare the positions taken with current writing on the subject,
and to see to what extent the same positions can be seen in the
behavior of the state legislatures.
By the late nineteen twenties, all states save four 37 had adopted
some legislation purporting to regulate campaign expenditures. The
federal government had similar legislation in its statute books
since 1910.38 In 1921, the Supreme Court of the United States had
declared unconstitutional the federal legislation insofar as it sought
to regulate the conduct of primary elections held prior to the
adoption of the seventeenth amendment;39 and there was consid-
erable difference of opinion as to the authority of the federal gov-
ernment to regulate primaries held after the adoption of the amend-
ment.4 0 This decision led to a sharp renewal of interest in corrupt
dates voted for at the same time and on the same ticket, it is impossible to follow
closely the English law." Ibid.
"The Michigan law which has been referred to as comparatively deficient and
ineffective, was repealed in 1901." Id. at 132.
34. "A publicity law undoubtedly assists in the effective operation of the corrupt
practices laws, but is not itself a penal statute. A corrupt practices act is." Id. at 24.
35. OvERAcsE 343.
36. See note 2 supra.
37. Illinois, Mississippi, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. See SiKES 284, Table 6.
38. Act of June 25, 1910, c. 392, 36 STAT. 822.
39. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
40. See OvRAcER 242.
[Vol. 51
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practices and publicity legislation, both national and state. In 1925,
Congress had repealed the acts of 1910 and 1911,41 and reenacted
them without the portions deemed offensive by the Court.4 2
It was in this context of renewed interest that Party Campaign
Funds,4 3 Money in Elections,44 and Corrupt Practice Legislation45
were written. Each of these works attempts to collect the experi-
ence of the past, evaluate it in the light of present conditions, and
make recommendations for future conduct. The proposed solutions
will be examined in the same order in which the 1904 argument
was framed.
The first work, Pollock's Party Campaign Funds, takes the
orthodox publicity law position:
If the limiting provisions actually limited the amount of
money which might be expended, they could be defended. But
it is almost the universal opinion of politicians and officials
that such provisions do not have any effect upon restraining
political expenditures.... Legal limitations on the amount con-
tributed, or prohibitions against the acceptance of contribu-
tions from certain persons, are quite futile. The escape from
abuses along these lines lies through a system of publicity
which will keep the people informed as to what the party
treasurers are doing.46
Professor Sikes' book, Corrupt Practices Legislation, lies at the
other pole of the argument. Commenting on recent legislation on
the subject, he expresses the opinion that the limitation approach
is the most practical means of controlling campaign expenditures.
He further indicates that only individual contributions should be
permitted, and that a ceiling on their amount should be imposed.
All contributions, he felt, should be made to the responsible agent
of the candidate; candidates should be held responsible for ex-
penditures made upon their behalf, whether they know about them
or not; and penalties should consist of both fines and imprisonment
and disqualification to hold office 4 7
The third work examined, Money in Elections, represents the
middle position. Its author, Professor Overacker, is even stronger
than Pollock in her criticism of ceiling limits on expenditures. She
indicates that in an attempt to avoid the impact of the ceiling
limit, committees burgeon and responsibility for party finances is
fractionalized. The result is not to restrict campaign expenditures,
41. These were the provisions dealing with primary elections.
42. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 STAT. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241 (1952).
43. POLLOCK, PRTY CAMPAIGN FUNDS (1926).
44. OvR~cxER, MoNy IN ELECtIONS (1932).
45. SiiEs, CoRRuPT PRAcricms LEGISLATION (1928).
46. POLLOCK 248.
47. Sims 251-52.
19571
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but to undermine the publicity laws.48 She further suggests that
the real danger lies not in oversupport of one candidate but in
undersupport of candidates who cannot call upon the services of
one of the major party organizations. The corrective, she believes,
is some form of state aid to candidates. The author is not so dis-
trustful of regulations of contributions. She suggests that in the
interest of stockholders, the prohibition of corporate political
expenditures should be retained.49
Against this spectrum of opinion of some twenty-five years ago,
we turn to the more recent comment on the subject. Three articles
have been chosen for purposes of comparison. The first of these
is written by Robert A. Bicks and Howard I. Friedman.5 0 Although
the article deals directly with the Federal Corrupt Practices Act,51
the opinions with regard to the efficacy of control methods and a
desirable pattern for the future are expressed in sufficiently
general terms so that they apply to the efforts of the states as
well. Bicks and Friedman suggest, as did Overacker in 1932,52
that the ceiling limit on expenditures be repealed.53 They also go
further and suggest that the limitation on the contributions of
corporations is unenforceable, while the limitations on contribu-
tions by labor unions are only partially effective. Because of this
discrepancy, labor unions are now placed at a disadvantage and,
therefore, both prohibitions should be repealed. 54 Conceding the
desirability of regulating certain uses of money in elections, such
as bribing and treating, the authors suggest that not only are
ceiling limitation statutes unlikely to be effective, and not only
do they interfere with the probabilities that publicity legislation
will be effective, but also that they actually hamper the growth of
what the writers call "issue politics."
The second work, an unsigned note in the Harvard Law Review,55
concedes the importance of publicity provisions, makes suggestions
for the improvement of their administration, but adds: "Publicity
alone does not solve the problem of vast sums spent in elections and
the inequality in resources of the major parties. ' 56 The writer
agrees with the critics of present day legislation who maintain
48. OVERACKER 385.
49. Id. at 388.
50. Bicks and Friedman, Regulation of Election Finance: A Case of Misguided
Morality, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 975 (1953).
51. 43 STAT. 1070 (1925), 2 U.S.C. § 241 (1952). The article also deals with the
Hatch Political Activity Act, 62 STAT. 720 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 591 (1952), and the
Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 159 (1947), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
52. OvaRAcKER 385.
53. Bicks and Friedman, supra note 51, at 998.
54. Id. at 999.
55. 66 HARV. L. REv. 1259 (1953).
56. Ibid.
[Vol. 51
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that low ceilings have made enforcement impossible and that lack
of enforcement has the unfortunate result of fractionalizing party
administration and defeating the ends of the publicity sections.
He suggests, however, that if ceilings were raised to realistic fig-
ures, the laws could be made to work.57
The third work, also an unsigned note, is a critique of the Min-
nesota law which provides, among other things, that only $7,000
can be spent by a candidate for governor, or in his behalf.58 Candi-
dates for other offices may spend between $100 (candidate for
presidential elector from any congressional district) and $3,500
(state offices other than that of governor).59 The writer notes that
as a result of restrictive court decisions and inadequate enforce-
ment machinery, the Minnesota statute has been largely ineffectual
in limiting expenditures. 60 He goes on to say that the low expendi-
ture limits have provided candidates with a choice between run-
ning a dispirited campaign or violating the law. The writer con-
cludes that not only are the present limits unrealistic but in the
nature of things there is no sufficiently scientific basis for deter-
mining the proper limits to justify the imposition of any limit
at all.61
The suggested alternative is that of Belmont, 62 and of Pollock,63
and Overacker. 64 In support of this recommendation attention is
called to the experience in Florida after the legislature repealed
the ceiling provisions of the law. The Florida experiment is de-
scribed as a notable success and Minnesota is exhorted to follow
the good example. 65
Recent Legislation
Where the advice from scholars and men of affairs has been so
consistent over so long a period, it is to be expected that legislation
will follow along the lines which they have marked out. This is
exactly what has happened. This process of groping for solutions
can be illustrated by a comparison of the legislation in two sister
states, Maine and New Hampshire.
57. Ibid.
58. Note, Minnesota Corrupt Practices Act, 40 MINN. L. REv. 156 (1955).
59. MINN. STAT. § 211.06 (1953).
60. Note, Minnesota Corrupt Practices Act, 40 MINN. L. REv. 156, 158 (1955).
61 Id. at 159.
62. See note 32 supra.
63. POLLOCK 248.
64. OvWRAcnma. 338.
65. Note, Minnesota Corrupt Practices Act, 40 MINN. L. REv. 156, 167 (1955):
.. [T]his new law has resulted in accurate and comprehensive financial infor-
mation. Candidates closely watched their opponent's financial reports to uncover
violations of the law; thus a type of 'self-policing' has resulted from this statute
which forces disclosure of pertinent financial information."
1957]
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Both had adopted campaign fund publicity legislation in the
early part of the twentieth century. 66 Both had also adopted stat-
utes specifying legitimate expenditures,6 7 and placing ceiling limits
on campaign expenditures. 68 In both cases, the arrival of the late
nineteen twenties found these limits unchanged since their adop-
tion and so low as to be unrealistic. In Maine, the legislation applied
only to primary elections and the limit upon the expenditures of
a candidate for nomination for governor was $1,500.69 In New
Hampshire the provision applied to both primary and general elec-
tions and in both instances the limit was $1,000.70 In both cases
expenditures permitted candidates for other offices were propor-
tionately low. 71
In 1927, New Hampshire raised the ceiling on expenditures in
primaries from $1,000 to $8,000, but left unchanged the $1,000
limit on expenditures in the general election.72 In 1947, the limit
on expenditures in general elections was raised from $1,000 to
$3,000. 73 In 1955, when the election code was extensively revised,
these limits were raised from $8,000 in the primary and $3,000 in
the general election to $25,000 and $20,000.74 The limit imposed
upon the spending of state committees remained the same until
1955, when it was raised from $25,000 to $100,000.75 In the same
year a limit of $5,000 was placed on individual contributions, ex-
cept contributions by a candidate to his own campaign fund.76 The
1955 revision also provides for a measure of centralization of re-
sponsibility in the management of campaign funds in that candi-
dates are required to appoint a fiscal agent who shall approve all
disbursements made on behalf of a candidate for nomination at
any primary election.7 7 Political committees are defined and it is
provided that those spending over $200 must file financial state-
66. Me. Laws 1916, c. 7, § 17; N.H. Laws 1911, c. 101, §§ 2-8.
67. Me. Laws 1916, c. 7, § 128; N.H. Laws 1915, c. 169, §§ 4, 5.
68. Me. Laws 1916, c. 6, § 21; N.H. Laws 1915, c. 169, § 2.
69. Me. Laws 1916, c. 6.
70. N.H. Laws 1915, c. 169, § 2.
71. The $1,500 limitations in Maine applied to all officers elected on a state-wide
basis, candidates for the United States Senate included. Candidates for the United
States House of Representatives were allowed $500; candidates for the state senate
and county officers were allowed $150 per each 10,000 votes cast for governor
within the county during the last gubernatorial election. Candidates for the state
legislature from districts with three or more representatives were allowed $150;
others, $50. Me. Laws 1916, c. 7, § 21. The $1,000 limitation in New Hampshire
applied to candidates for governor and United States Senator. The limit applicable
to general elections, in the case of a candidate for the United States House of
Representatives, was $750; councilor, $250; state senator or county officer, $150;
and representative of the General Court, $50. N.H. Laws 1915, c. 169, § 4.
72. N.H. Laws 1927, c. 137, § 3.
73. N.H. Laws 1947, c. 205, § 3.
74. N.H. REv. LAWS c. 70, § 4(1 & II) (Supp. 1955).
75. Id. § 4.
76. Id. § 2.
77. Id. § 12.
[Vol. 51
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ments;78 in addition, there is a provision that no "payment or
contribution of money or thing of value, whether tangible or in-
tangible, shall be made to a candidate, a political committee, or
political party or in behalf of a candidate, political party, or meas-
ure, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of promoting the success
or defeat of any candidate, political party, or measure. .. if made
without the knowledge and written consent of the candidate or his
fiscal agent, a political committee or its treasurer, or to any one
of the same."' 79 It is explicitly provided that expenditures made by
political committees or by others are to be included in computing
the total expenditures for the application of the ceiling pro-
visions.8 0
In Maine, the ceiling placed upon expenditures in primaries re-
mained the same from 1913, the year in which it was first enacted,
until 1931.81 At that time the section was simply repealed and since
1931 Maine has placed no limits on political expenditures or on
political contributions, nor is there any regulation of source of
contributions.82 In lieu of such regulations, Maine has relied wholly
on publicity, strengthened by provisions seeking to promote cen-
tralization of responsibility in election finance.8 3 In 1953, provision
was also made for a biennial legislative committee to investigate
the expenditures made on behalf of candidates for nomination for
office throughout the state.84 In 1955, the legislature repealed the
provision prohibiting persons other than the candidate from
making any contribution to any person other than to a treasurer or
political agent within six months of any election,8 5 and deleted the
provision permitting a candidate to act as his own political agent.86
Other states which have enacted recent legislation on the subject
have abolished limits,8 7 raised limits,88 changed the formula used
in computing limits,89 changed enforcement provisions,90 broad-
78. Id. §§ 8, 9.
79. Id. § 2.
80. Id. § 4.
81. Me. Laws 1916, c. 7, § 17.
82. ME. REV. STAT. c. 9 (1954).
83. ME. REv. STAT. c. 9, § 2 (Supp. 1955).
84. ME. REv. STAT. c. 4, § 44 (1954).
85. ME. REV. STAT. c. 9, § 3 (Supp. 1955).
86. Id. § 2.
87. E.g., California in 1949, Cal. Stat. 1949, c. 192, § 1; North Carolina in 1951,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163.196 (1952).
88. E.g., Alabama, from $10,000 to $50,000 for candidates for governor and
senator, ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 272 (Supp. 1955) ; New Mexico primary expenditures
from $2,500 to $5,000 in the case of candidates for nomination for governor and
from $3,500 to $7,000 in the case of candidates for nomination for United States
Senator, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-11-60 (Supp. 1955); New York from $10,000 to
$20,000, N.Y. ELECrioN LAW § 781 (1) (Supp. 1956) ; Virginia from fifteen cents per
vote cast for the candidate of his party receiving the largest vote in the last pre-
ceding gubernatorial election to fifty cents, VA. CODE § 24-402 (Supp. 1956).
89. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 129.100 (Vernon Supp. 1956) provides that cam-
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ened coverage, 91 narrowed coverage, 92 and they have rewritten acts
with no substantial changes. 9 3
This groping for solutions can be illustrated equally well by a
review of the legislation in a single state over the course of the
past four decades. The legislative history of the Florida act is a
case in point. The basic primary election law of Florida was en-
acted in 189794 and 1913. 95 Like most such laws it provided that
candidates must file under oath a statement of campaign expendi-
tures. Failure to file the required statement resulted in disqualifi-
cation; and any election official who issued to a non-complying can-
didate a certificate of election or nomination, or placed his name on
the ballot in the general election, was subject to fine and imprison-
ment.96 The law also limited the legal objectives of expenditures
to those set out in the act, and all expenditures for other objectives
were made punishable by fine and imprisonment. 97 Total expendi-
tures were limited to amounts set out in the statute, ranging from
$4,000 in the case of a candidate for governor or United States
Senator to $100 in that of a candidate for a place on the county
executive committee of a political party.9 8 Expenditures in excess
of these amounts were punishable by fine and imprisonment.99 In
1927, when the corrupt practices acts were being brought under
paign expenditures may not exceed $4 per 100 votes cast in the last preceding
election for the same office. Formerly § 129.100 provided a flat limit of $200 where
fewer than 5,000 votes were cast in the previous election for the same office, $4 per
100 votes for the next 20,000 votes, $2 per vote for the next 25,000, and $1 per vote
for all in excess of 50,000.
90. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 12.22 (1955), in part, provides:
(1) If any elector of the State shall have within his possession information
that any provision of this chapter, has been violated by any candidate for which
such elector had the right to vote, or by any personal campaign committee of such
candidate, or any member thereof, he may, by verified petition, apply to the
county judge of the county in which such violation has occurred, to the attorneygeneral of the state, or to the governor of the state, for leave to bring a special
proceeding to investigate and determine whether or not there has been such
violation by such candidate or by any such committee or member thereof, and
for the appointment of special counsel to conduct such proceeding in behalf of
the state.(2) If there shall appear from such petition or otherwise that such candidate,
committee or member thereof has violated any provision of this chapter, and that
sufficient evidence is obtainable to show that there is probable cause to believe
that such proceeding may be successfully maintained, then such judge or attorney
general or governor, as the case may be, shall grant leave to bring such pro-
ceeding and shall appoint special counsel to conduct such proceeding.
In subsequent sections, provision is made for serving of process, trial, judgment,
and appeal. The penalty provided is forfeiture of office.
91. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. tit. XI, c. 62(b) (1955).
92. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 55, § 4 (Supp. 1955).
93. Conn. Spec. Laws 1953, c. 368.
94. Fla. Laws 1897, c. 4538, §§ 1, 2.
95. Fla. Laws 1913, c. 6470.
96. Id. §§ 19, 20.
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.172 (Supp. 1955).
98. Fla. Laws 1913, c. 6470, § 2.
99. Id. § 4.
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new attacks as being unrealistic, Florida acted to increase her
maximum expenditure schedule from a top of $4,000 to $15,000,
with corresponding increases down the line.100
Until 1949, the law remained virtually unchanged. However,
some effort was made to keep abreast of technological improve-
ments; thus, the provision in the laws of 1941 added to the list of
legitimate expenses the hire of radio time and public address
equipment.' 0 ' Prior to this amendment, the statute mentioned only
expenditures for hiring of halls. 0 2
In 1949, Florida, like Maine, acted to abolish ceiling limits on
expenditures. The act, which took effect without the approval of
the governor, further provided that "all such candidates shall file
under oath complete and true statements of the actual sums ex-
pended in the furtherance of their candidacy."' 0 3 These simple
provisions remained to be expanded and implemented by subse-
quent legislation, and although Florida has not re-enacted a ceiling
on expenditures, she has experimented with other methods of
holding down the amount of money expended by candidates for
office. The prohibition against corporate contributions was con-
tinued'04 and other groups, including holders of racing permits,
users of public utility franchises, and holders of alcoholic beverage
licenses, whether corporate or not, were included in the category
of persons who were prohibited from making political contribu-
tions.105 Individuals permitted to make contributions were limited
to a maximum of $1,000 in the interest of any one candidate, at
any election, primary or general.' 0 6
In an effort to make this section effective and to aid in the en-
forcement of the reporting and publicity sections, provision was
made for the complete centralization of collection and disburse-
ment of campaign funds. Each candidate must appoint a cam-
paign treasurer and designate a depository for campaign funds.
The campaign treasurer may then appoint deputy treasurers and
other depositories may be named. However, all contributions must
be made to the campaign treasurer or to his deputies, including
contributions by the candidate on his own behalf and contributions
by members of the candidate's family, and all expenditures must
be made or approved by the campaign treasurer.107
In 1955, state and county committees were brought under the
100. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.62 (Supp. 1955).
101. Id. § 102.61.
102. Fla. Laws 1913, c. 6470, § 1.
103. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25273, § 1.
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.091 (Supp. 1955).
105. Fla. Laws 1951, c. 26819, § 2.
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 99.161 (1) (a) (Supp. 1955).
107. Id. § 99.161(2).
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reporting requirement, 0 8 and provision was made that any elector
having information of any violation of the prohibition against
the making of campaign contributions by corporations, racing per-
mit holders, liquor licensees, and public utilities may file a com-
plaint. The appropriate agency must then investigate the com-
plaint and refer its findings of fact to the state's attorney for filing
of a petition and pleadings in the circuit court in the appropriate
county. 0 9
Looking Toward the Future
At this point it may be asked why we are thinking the same
thoughts and saying the same things about election finance and
its regulation that we were thinking and saying half a century
ago and repeating twenty-five years later. Why are we enacting,
amending, and repealing the same sort of legislation which we
were enacting, amending, and repealing at the turn of the century9
One partial answer may lie in the circumstance that the Republi-
cans occupy the White House; the Democrats are on the outside
searching for issues which will aid them in 1960 and which, in
the interim, will reassure them that their cause is righteous. The
first fervor over campaign finance regulation followed Judge
Parker's charges that large contributions to the Republican cam-
paign fund in the election of 1904 were made with the expectation
of payment in political favors ;110 and, although care was taken to
preserve the non-partisan character of the publicity legislation
drive, the issue has always been one which has appealed more to
Democrats, characterizing themselves, as they do, as the represent-
atives of the less wealthy elements of the community. Mr. Perry
Belmont's pamphlet on campaign fund regulation issued in 1912
was signed "not in my capacity as president of the Publicity Law
Association but in my individual capacity, and as a Democrat." '
The second period of high interest in election finance came toward
the close of the twelve years of Republican incumbency between
1920 and 1932.
Undoubtedly the change in character and cost of campaign tech-
nique, first felt in the campaign of 1952 and refined in 1956, will
have the effect of heightening interest in the problem. The televi-
sion campaign which President Eisenhower liked to refer to as
bringing the Republican message to the people was characterized by
Democrats as an attempt to sell a presidential candidate like soap.
The protest against this new, costly, and apparently effective cam-
108. Id. § 99.161(1)-(13).
109. Id. § 104.27(9).
110. OVERACKER 234-35.
111. BELmONT, RETURN TO SECRET PARTY FUNDS 3 (1927).
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paign medium was also expressed in the steady Democratic criti-
cism of "Madison Avenue."
Certainly, however, these fortuities of political posture do not
constitute a satisfactory explanation for our fiftly years of fum-
bling in the area of campaign finance regulation. The problem cuts
much deeper. It touches upon people's fundamental attitudes
toward democratic government. If Americans were universally
willing to accept Professor Overacker's concept of democracy as
a peaceful means of rendering to effective majorities that which
in any event they could have seized,112 it is doubtful that we should
have spent so much time and effort on trying to regulate political
spending. This view of Democracy is too lacking in idealism to
be popular. Americans would prefer to think of their form of gov-
ernment as an institution which arrives at answers to public ques-
tions which represent the distilled wisdom of the electorate solemnly
rendered after rational discussion and sober thought.
It is recognized, of course, that to avoid coercion the secrecy of
elections must be maintained; and that if the secrecy of elections
is to be maintained, no effort can be made to judge the logic of
the individual voter's decision. A vote is a vote, whether it repre-
sents a carefully thought out position on foreign policy or farm
policy, or whether it reflects the fact that the voter is attracted
by the personality of the candidate. The suggestion, however, that
the voter should be motivated by personal financial considerations
is odious to the popular concept of Democracy. It could be said,
of course, that most voting reflects the voter's judgment as to what
will be best for the voter, rather than his decision as to what is
best "for the country." And it may even be that this is desirable
because, inasmuch as each voter is an expert at all, he is an expert
on his own best interests. It could be said, therefore, that the
essence of democratic government lies in the fact that each voter
expresses his judgment as to what is best for him and that the
total decision represents at least what is best for a majority. Where
the voter votes his judgment as to what is "best for the country,"
a matter on which he may have but vague notions, and these errone-
ous, it is easy to imagine situations in which no interests at all
are given honest expression. Nevertheless, Americans are normally
reluctant to think in these terms. We generally prefer to rational-
ize personal interest voting by identifying our individual interests
with the national interest.
This American dislike of admitting the legitimacy of personal
interest as a motive for voting is very old. In refusing to enforce
112. OvEmcKm 2-4.
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an obligation arising out of a wager on the outcome of a presi-
dential election, the Supreme Court of South Carolina said in 1830:
[B] ut I take the general principle [to be] that the wager
must be innocent, and have no improper tendency, however
remote. Can that be said in the present case? It gives each
bettor a pecuniary, and therefore improper, interest in the
election, or defeat, of a presidental candidate. It is true, that
neither of the parties had a voice in it ;i13 but the country has
a deep interest in preserving the purity of this election and
whatever gives a citizen an improper motive to promote, or
obstruct the elevation of a candidate, tends to affect the
purity."i 4
Given this conception of purity, it becomes the function of the state
to create conditions in which impure motives are least likely to
flourish, and thus we have attempted to outlaw all forms of bribery,
whether direct efforts to persuade the voter with promise of gain
through a job or a political favor, or simply entertaining him in
the hope that he will show the proper gratitude. In doing this we
have followed a long American tradition that what is impure, "there
oughta be a law against." The British act of 1883 prohibited ex-
penditures for music, torches, flags, banners, cockades, ribbons, or
other marks of distinction; and under this clause Mr. F. James
of Walsall was unseated upon proof that his political agent had
furnished six thousand cards with his picture to the electorate, to
be placed in the hat and inscribed, "Vote for James, we're bound
to win.""15 By contrast, an investigation of election expense state-
ments in Maine in 1929 revealed that one prominent candidate had
put down, "$50 for ice cream for the people at a picnic," in happy
ignorance that there was anything amiss in this expenditure." 6
Americans like picnics and they like pagentry. They dislike im-
purity, however, and improper tendencies, however remote, and feel
that there should be laws against them, so long as in their operation
these laws do not actually curb the picnics and the pagentry.
The legislation regulating the level of expenditures reflects this
same feeling that the law should forbid that which has a tendency
toward corruption, so long as it does not interfere with the tradi-
tional splendor of elections. In some ways the case for limitation
of campaign contributions is more in keeping with democratic prin-
ciples than regulations designed to control the motives of the
voters. Whatever might be said about the propriety of personal
113. This case was decided before the popular vote had become as influential as
it now is in the election of the President.
114. Laval v. Myers, 1 Bailey 486, 491 (S.C. 1830).
115. GREcoRY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 271.
116. HORmELL, CoRRUPr PRACTICEs LEGISLATION IN MAINE AND How IT WORKS
(1929).
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motivations of individual voters, it may be conceded that officials
elected by the people have a duty to serve all the people and that
conditions which make for the election of officials financially be-
holden to a small group of large campaign contributors tend to
subvert this concept of even-handed administration of public affairs.
Though easier to reconcile with democratic doctrine, the regu-
lation of amount has been much more difficult than the regulation
of purpose. The American pattern of electing everybody from the
President to the members of the municipal bench, often at the same
election, involving a vast congeries of supporter groups organized
on local, state, and national levels, and working for candidates in
all combinations, makes it next to impossible to keep track of
finances. The Gore Committee, investigating the finances in the
1956 presidential election, estimated that the cost of the election
would really never be known because of the existence of hundreds
of committees active in the support of both the presidential ticket
and local candidates. More important, perhaps, is the fact that
since the cost of elections has been rising at a phenomenal rate,
ceilings on expenditures become unrealistic in a very short while.
It is estimated that the presidential campaign of 1956 cost in the
neighborhood of $100,000,000.117 But the aggregate cost of elec-
tions held at the same time is problematical. There is no reason
to believe that as the population increases the cost of campaigning
will not continue to rise. The only way in which limits can be
seriously considered is in the context of a conscious desire to
change the type of political campaign waged in American politics.
This may conceivably take place in some localities and we can look
forward to a continued experimentation with ceiling limits coupled
with provisions seeking to fix responsibility for expenditures. That
it will become a national phenomenon, however, may well be
doubted.
Attempts to limit contributions rather than expenditures have
been less common but can be expected to be used more frequently.
They strike at large donations on the theory that it is unhealthy
for a candidate to draw his financial backing from a few wealthy
donors, thus entering public office indebted to these persons for his
election. In theory such provisions force the candidate to aim at a
broader base of contributions if he is to raise enough money to
support the rising cost of campaigning. It is interesting to note
that this legislation seems to be on the rise at a time when it is
also popular to amend the provisions regulating illegal contribu-
tions to bring within the prohibited classes contributions made by
labor unions, apparently on the theory that the pressure for the
117. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1956, p. 40, col. 2. •
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solicitation of smaller contributions might result in the increase
of pressure for institutional assessment.
The most trying problems of election finance, those posed by
sharp differences between the resources of the major parties, re-
main virtually untouched, though the limitation of individual con-
tributions and prohibition of corporate donations is an oblique ap-
proach to the problem. It has been well stated that the most vital
problem in financing elections is the one of insuring adequate
financing of both sides, rather than limiting the amount which
either side is permitted to spend.118 No state has as yet experi-
mented with campaign. expense subsidies, at least in recent
years,119 and the federal government has shown no inclination to
lead the way. However, suggestions along such lines as franking
privileges for candidates and free time requirements attached to
television and radio licenses are occasionally seen in commentaries.
To close with a prediction, it seems likely to the present writer
that we shall continue to fumble with ceiling limits, with regula-
tion of source of contributions, with oaths of compliance, and with
legislative investigations, complete with long reports. There will
be occasional repeal of limitations on expenditures and there will
be a continued effort to strengthen reporting features in the present
legislation. There will be a slow shift to control of contributions.
There will be the usual efforts to keep limits in realistic ranges,
with the usual lag. There will also undoubtedly be enough violation
of all these provisions to keep us equipped with the sort of election
carnivals to which we are accustomed. Americans simply do not
want to abandon the cards in the hat, nor television, nor parades.
Finally, we shall continue to feel strongly opposed to improper
motives and even traces of impurity, obligated to have statutes out-
lawing all such evils, and worried because they do not seem to work.
118. OVERACKER 381.
119. Colorado conducted such an experiment in 1909. Colo. Sess. Laws 1909,
c. 141. The statute was declared unconstitutional in 1910. People ex rel. Bradley
v. Galligan and Kenehan, unreported opinion decided Oct. 10, 1910, cited in OvEa-
AcKER 318. The act was repealed by Colo. Sess. Laws 1921, c. 63.
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